General-Inspector of the Austrian Federal-Army, General Karl MAJCEN, Interview at the OSCE-Seminar in Vienna's Imperial Palace, Jan. 28th 1998

JDW: As Austria is the host-nation to the OSCE-organisation, what are its weights and its benefits for todays larger-Europes security-situation from your point of view ?

Gen. MAJCEN: I think that this seminar was not only a strong sign of life of the OSCE as an institution and as a basis for security-cooperation, than also as a basic-framework for the attitudes of nations. These means all the perspectives in the context of security-policy and military-matters. The OSCE has its mission in todays Europe and well into the 21st century and here it was again able to proof that there are functions which only the OSCE is best suited to. With its 54 member-nations it is a broad-forum - with all disadvantages of this broad structure coming to desicions - but if a solution has been found, its weight makes it very difficult to ignore internationally. Of course OSCE can not build any juridical or obliging frames, but it can develop some concrete frame-perspectives, some like an behavioural-codex in the field of international-security. These are a kind of scale for the other organisations which will go in for carrying-out the realization then. With OSCE-limits, the security-community gets an instrument in its hand to tell nations or contrahends, "hey you, there is an assembly of 54 nations from Vladivostok to Vancouver, that has agreed on the desired. You have until now not agreed to that and may - altough sometimes in medium-terms - face the consequences of your manner."

JDW: All these frame-perspectives, despite - like critics mention - there are no own structures to support on and conclusions have to be adressed further, for example to NATO ?

Gen. MAJCEN: Most important for me is, that there is an ever-searched united-desicion-need within OSCE. If there is no united-conclusion between or about two or more crisis-parties, only because they are members of OSCE, if there is no solution as the sending of peacekeeping-forces - like to Albania for example - , then the mission willl not take place. It may be, that the crisis become a matter of the UN then, and they must put their effort on a mandate of the security-council and to find someone to do the pacification, like it has happend before. Sure, there are always the enforcement-oriented, which are from time to time repeating that OSCE is an instrument without teeth. There are other organisations "with teeth" also, but the main role of OSCE is understand on a broad basis and oriented to the political and economic realities within todays Europe. When it comes to implemenet sanctions, it will support on the very professional instrument of NATO, for example. NATO is still a defence-oriented community and others than primary self-defence roles have to be lead by international organisations like the UN, or just OSCE. Therefore the later needs no own standing enforcement-units and therefore its is also a good field of acting for an Austrian participation.

JDW: As a united position to its future within Europes security has not been stated publicly until today, what self-definitions and visions are there specially for Austria within OSCE ?

Gen. MAJCEN: Yes for sure, there are some decisions in this context to do in our next future. Therefore it is important to mention that Austria is the seat of the general-secretariate of the OSCE, the host-nation. It can be expected by the organsiation, that specially its host face positivley to its demands and needs. There are every-day supports to different missions like Tadjikistan or Georgia for example, which are today done continuesly. Like I already said, there are no own staff-specialists and therefore the host is asked usually. So are Austrians manning satellite-communication-sites, they are shaping-up materials staged here for different missions. Demands like intermediate-storage, preparation and painting of 4WD-vehicles, assembly of drinking-water facilities and other logistic questions are permanently solved by us. Something different is the participation of Austrian Federal-Army troops in peace-keeping missions abroad. From declaring to realisation, there is sometimes a longer term to expect. For example, Austria has declared to send troops to an OSCE-mission in Nagorny-Karabakh, but these has never again been asked for. So, Austria definite itself as the main supporter of the permanent needs of the organisation and our vision within is simple: "Taking part with units and specialists in every mission, that is concluded in unity." From my point of view, OSCE is an very good instrument to Europe's stability, but not its sole or main security-provider.

JDW: Contrary to your last statement, the OSCE is often cited as one of the alternatives or as a substitude to a possible NATO-entry of Austria, which is strongly and often fiercly discussed within the public. Where do you see the way into the nations security-future ?

Gen. MAJCEN: The first part of your question is very simple and this seminar has proven: OSCE is no alternative in the question about to be or not to be in NATO. It has its role in a summary-aspect of security-policy and crisis-prevention but it is no single- or main-option for long-term security- and military-orientations of Austria. As an argument in daily politics about this important future-question, it is often used but anyway wrong. In talking about a possible NATO-entry of Austria, some general statements first. Questioned as a responsible soldier, it is clear that this is a political decision. I expect that freely-elected politics in our todays system will decide for me the in the direction of the best and most appropriate way for my future and I say that as a citizen and as the highest-ranking soldier combined. If the politicians will take-up these questions seriously, they must define before where the interests of Austria are laid. These questions are accordingly the same as the ones about the future main-demands to the Bundesheer. I believe that in all this field, there is considerable demand for ongoing discussions. But what a dedicated observer here can easily see, is that often stand-points are chosen, which are absolutly not to be security- or strategic-driven, than are far more looking what is appropriate to daily inner-politics. I do not want to critisize that fundamentally, than in todays understanding of democracy, you have to note to public-opinion and electors-will. But is on the Austrian leaders not to do what is publicly popular, than to make popular what is necessary ! Yesterday we had the opportunity to meet and ask the Hungarian Chief of Staff Vegh and Defence-Secretary Dyarmati what Hungary has favoured to orient towards NATO, what were their calculations ? Beside the historic aspects - which are others for Austria - they fielded a very good argument. They have discussed broadly for a long time about that matters, but they have not found a single disadvantage for Hungary within NATO. Altough they had to mention that it may be much easier to favour the arguments for NATO within the hungarian public, than in front of the Austrian one. In Hungary the only political opponents are the former communists, and if they oppose some question, one can be sure that the overwhelming majority is definitly in favour of it ! That very shaped positions we cannot find in Austria, for sure. So the future for us must be either alone and strenghtend or and streamed and specialized within a present or future alliance.

JDW: Within the Austrian public, the last months brought deep and sometimes contrary-productive conflicts about a major reform-package, another "Heeresreform" like it was realized at the beginning of the 90's. Strikingly visible were the deep gaps in the ideas about the standing and mobilisation-numbers or the un-unity about the Draken-Follower, presented by the two main ruling coalition-parties. What could be behind that internationaly untypic approach on security-matters ?

Gen. MAJCEN: First it is to say, that all these are "only" political-statements and what you hear in the public today is also "only" a political-discussion. I will try to concentrate on the facts first. At the beginning of the 90's, we have started and achieved a deep-reform package, called the "Heeresgliederung-Neu" (Army-structure-New), or HG-Neu. This was a primary a reaction on the changed strategic-situation in Europe, but also to the funds to be expected. The defence-council agreed, that the minister-in-charge will have to report to the board-of-ministers about the achieved results later. This report was presented by the current minister at the end of '96 and was approved by the parlament. This approval was made dependent on a few general measures, like a further streaming of the command-structure, a reduction in mobilisation-numbers etc. Since this 13 months, there was the political-demand signalling repeatedly, that we had to (re-)act now. This re-acting had two subjects behind to consider. First the ongoing changes in the security-environment around us, like the future integration of three neighboring states into NATO, the current NATO-discussion within Austria, Amsterdam-treaty etc, and second it was the situation in resources. Resources in personal and in financial aspects. I can uncompromised say, that the defence-budget in Austria was frozen-in since the start of the 90's. The vague-signalled funds around 1% GNP - related to the achieved "HG-Neu" 1992 / 93 -, never became reality. Contrary even, we had a decline to around 0,8%! Finally, this fell together with increasing demands to the forces, like more tasks and missions at home and abroad (Schengen, Alba, SFOR etc.). We simply had to cover real combat-missions with annual costs of about öS 800 mls. out of a peacetime-bugdet. This developed an additional cost-factor which is now argued against the forces, throwing before that there is a bad budgetary-culture within the military, too high costs for personel etc. But that's funny in one way, because it is clear that all these added demands since 1992 have increased specially the costs for the human-factor. But as the budget-figure is frozen and we cannot stop the every-day run within the forces or reduce the basic-training, we only could cut material-investments and further streaming structures and reduce levels or commands. These details are the one's presented finally by me to the Minister a few weeks ago and discussed in the papers now. Discussed so fiercly, because between the options to do nothing and the demands from the Social-Democrats to massive reduce numbers, we have chosen the middle. Not only because of the money, than also to signal psycological to our active-corps that we will not take the possible loss of human-capital on a risky-shoulder. You cannot surpress pride and motivation down below a certain level. And that minor-level was clearly in sight. Toughts like, "will I hold my current post at this town, and further my post allover...?" were heared more and more. These considerations and not only the reductional-details, like quarters, garrisons or barracks, it was to talk about. But if one want's to preserve something, he has to tell where it could be cut on the other hand. Remember, that the optional-paper by the government relating to Austrias further security-position will be presented to the public in spring 1998. According to that vague-expectations, the outcome of the renewed structure is neverthless a much more professional, leaner and modern Bundesheer, better suited to Austria's mid-term future. The changes around us make reformes necessary but the accompaning-measures, common in other public or economic-sectors, cannot be fixed at the beginning of these processes. They can become "conditions", when the task or the target is clear. This target is to be formulated and openly announced within 1998. But if it is in the direction of NATO or not, some investment-questions are to be cleared after that reform will start.

DW: Again, one of that mentioned questions remains as the most urgent. A possible sucessor to the Saab-Draken will not be paid out of saved budget parts, resulting from restructurings. What steps in that controversal case will we see in the near-future ?

Gen. MAJCEN: The problem is there but it is still not to late. You are right, a sucsessor should hang in "approach" right now, but maybe it is helpful to calm down and look at the facts. With the decision to purchase the Saab Draken, a deeply-renewed but anyway used aircraft, the question of the running costs was cleared and implementet into the contract: we also purchase a further 1000 flying-hours which were converted into a 10-year-span. To this expected period, the heavy maintenance-measures by the producer were shaped. It is necessary to tell clearly that this package was what we bought and what was approved by the politics in 1985. This time-frame had ended in 1995. Nothing has moved in that question since then and the so-called 'flying against statistics' could only be dedicated to the technical-responsibles at the Fliegerwerft (Maint.Centre) and their superb job. It's again also a psycological-factor. The constant statements in the medias or the public-announcements - the same coments have been made before the Draken came, by the way - that future jet-flying in Austria will be unnecessary and stopped etc., could lead to a situation where no new pilot-candidates are showing up and more operational-pilots will leave the service into airline-business than today. But it also important to say and often surpressed, that the main task of this interceptors is to secure the souvereignity of the still-neutrally Austrian airspace. Additionally we have the strange phenonema, that a lot of people care and discuss about the Schengen-duties at the borders, but nobody talks about Schengen in the air!

All together it is necessary to state clearly: Currently we are still able to provide the dedicated role, but the aircrafts parts and systems are aeging. The wiring - which was not changed because of the 10-year option - and others are causing problems etc. So the output on flying-hours will decrease. This will produce the efficency and productivity of the pilots to sink slowly, as 10 hs/month is the international minimum. If I have to take some airframes of of service, the hours will again sink. Sooner or later, the moment will come when I have to report, that we cannot fulfill the dedicated-mission any longer.

We will continue to prepare for the follow-on type, to make tests and in-country-evaluations and to inform the public about our demands, until there is a political order to stop all that. Until there is the political desicion to stop the securing of a national supreme or executive role. Until the Defence-Council or the Def.-minister or anyone is telling me: The active control of the 20-miles high column belonging to the state-territory is axed from now, and we will be satisfied with passive-monitoring. This must be outspoken clear and distinct. I cannot believe that someone responsible is telling us: We do not need combat-aircafts, as every tacticians and analytics are considering a more and more rising importance of the 3rd dimension. As long as this task for Austria is not denied, we have to ask and remind the politics for the appropriate tool.

Considering and respecting financial- or budgetary constraints, we can accept that politics say that they do not want to place an order - now. This does not mean a total full-stop for the future. We have to have a basic-desicion. If there is the prospect that an order will be placed instantly at a time X in the future, for example at 2000, we can be prepared with all the evaluation- and preparation-steps then. If that is not clearly denied this could be an option, the flying and maintaining-personel can live with for a few short years. But if there is no political- will or -power to give us the appropriate tool in the foreseeable future, they should tell us tomorrow. But I don't think, the later will happen. Also because in the long-term finanicial-budget-declaration since 1996, there is one point beside the regular military-budget, stated without a figure until today. It says simply combat-aircraft - special-financing.

To the technical or type-question. We will do the evaluation impartial and unemotional. I think that we are internally in a good timeframe, as all the 5 contenders were flown by our pilots and two of them have been tested in Austria. In the near future, we will charge an independent institute abroad, to which we will hand over all gained facts. Relating to Austrian C3-systems and topography, they will figure-out the type with the most positive-parameters suited best for us. Next important fact in every acquisition are the life-cycle costs and securing of a constant support with parts and tools for the expected service-period. Additionally there was a brand-new up-to-date aviation-maint.-centre (Fliegerwerft) established at Zeltweg in 1996, and the type desicion will also be based upon their selection or capabilities.

Last but not least, it is necessary to have an eye upon our neighbours. Slovenia is in the steps to establish a small professional air-force around in the same time-frame as we have to renewal. During the same period, the Hungarians want to change over something modern replacing their obsolete planes, the Czech Air Force is confronted with the same desicion-demand and in Poland are also thoughts about a partly-modernization. It is very likely that this possible combination of interests could produce better price-conditions for a larger fleet, if faced by the producer. Therefore the struggles for political-desicion by all that nations about the future of their air-force, should be eased a little by the unification to a combined market-factor in that field.

Georg MADER, for JDW's News Editor IAN KEMP